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Is Athens Revived 
Jerusalem Denied? 
PHILIP L. QUINN 
ln his engaging reflections on the Aristotelian themes of happiness, virtue and 
friendship, Stanley Hauerwas extends and elaborates the pattern of his own ethi-
cal thought. He treats each of the three themes by first expounding Aristotle and 
then adding a theological postscript in which he suggests ways in which Aris-
totle's ethical thought might be appropriated by Christian ethics. The picture 
that emerges from this treatment is extremely generous to the pagan wisdom of 
Aristotle. Hauerwas gives the impression that Aristotle came close to being on 
target with respect to the ethical significance of happiness, virtue and friendship 
and so can be incorporated into Christian ethical thought with only minor modi-
fications and a few additions. 
I find this picture problematic. It seems to me to locate the center of gravity 
of Christian ethics too close to Athens and too far from Jerusalem. It also under-
estimates the extent to which Christian wisdom about the moral life can and 
should be seen as radically opposed to pagan wisdom. On many points of detail I 
have no quarrel with Hauerwas and find the crispness of his formulations and 
the shrewdness of his insights helpful. But I suspect that he and I would disagree 
sharply about fundamentals, for I am inclined to emphasize a different set of 
themes in trying to get at what is basic in Christian ethical thought. It is not that 
I have the temerity to suppose that Hauerwas is clearly mistaken in wanting to 
appropriate Aristotle. After all, Aquinas made a heroic effort to do just this, and 
he has had many followers among Christian theologians. It is rather that I am 
persuaded that other ways of understanding what is distinctive about Christian 
are apt to yield deeper insights. 
In these brief comments I can do no more than to sketch an alternative vision 
)f what the fundamental themes of Christian ethical thought are and to indicate 
iow they bear on the prospects for successfully appropriating Aristotle in the 
nanner proposed by Hauerwas. To fix ideas about what is at stake in the con-
lict, I begin with some reflections on how the history of Western ethical thought 
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should be narrated. I then discuss critically what Hauerwas has to say about hap-
piness, virtue and friendship. 
THE HISTORICAL ST AKES 
Nietzsche has taught us that we construct genealogies for two purposes: to 
help us understand our origins and to lend legitimacy to what we propose to do 
next. Histories of ethics are genealogical narratives for ethical theorists. So we 
should expect there to be a particular reading of the history of ethics in the back-
ground of the project of incorporating Aristotle into Christian ethics. 
Alasdair Macintyre, who is cited often and approvingly by Hauerwas, pro-
vides a narrative that lends legitimacy to the enterprise of appropriating Aris-
totle for Christian ethics.1 This story hinges on the attempt by Thomas Aquinas 
to incorporate an Aristotelian view of ethics into an Augustinian understanding 
of Christianity. The Thomistic synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine has for vari-
ous reasons not fared well at the hands of liberal modernity, but the tradition it 
represents contains untapped resources for dealing with the ethical problems 
Christians confront today. The task now facing Christian ethics is, therefore, to 
recover and exploit the riches of that tradition. Reflection on its roots in Aris-
totle is the natural starting point for such a project, and so theological reflections 
on Aristotelian themes are an important contribution to advancing the discus-
sion among Christian ethical theorists. 
That, in outline, is one story, but of course there are others that can be told. 
The one I prefer is meant to yield a genealogy that lends legitimacy to the enter-
prise of reviving the divine command tradition of Christian ethics. Its roots are in 
the scriptural narratives of a God who is lavish in commanding His chosen 
people. In this narrative, the Thomistic project will be portrayed as an audacious 
but unsuccessful attempt to graft the alien stock of Aristotelian paganism onto 
Augustinian Christianity. The failure of the Thomistic synthesis in ethics be-
comes apparent long before the heyday of liberal modernity, with its secularizing 
tendencies. It is foreshadowed by the flourishing of a fairly radical form of divine 
command ethics in the thought of the later medievals; scholastic sources of this 
progressive development are to be found in Scotus, Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean 
Gerson and Gabriel Biel, among others.2 The decisive event in this story is the 
Reformation. It liberates Augustinian Christianity by pruning away the alien 
stock that had been grafted onto it. 
An ethics of divine commands is, at bottom, not an ethics of virtue but an eth-
ics of duty. Divine commands impose obligations, and we who are commanded 
are bound to obey. So the great philosopher with whom divine command theo-
rists can feel at home is not Aristotle but Kant. In a way, this is not at all surpris-
ing, since Kant's own moral sensibilities were shaped by the Lutheran Christian-
ity of his culture. He tells us that "an ethical commonwealth can be thought of 
only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God, and indeed 
under laws of virtue."3 Sin, he says, is "the transgressing of the moral law as a 
divine command.'>4 Hence the task for Christian ethics today suggested by the 
story I have sketched is the assimilation of Kantian insights into the ongoing tra-
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dition of divine command ethics. Aristotle, by contrast, is to be viewed from a 
considerable critical distance, though he will, to be sure, occasionally have some-
thing worthwhile to say. It is this kind of critical and skeptical eye that I propose 
to cast on Hauerwas's reflections on Aristotle. 
I turn first to the question of happiness. Does the sort of human flourishing 
that Aristotle sets before us as an end comport well with Christian understand-
ings of the great drama of sin and salvation? 
SIN, SALVATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FLOURISHING 
The conviction that humans generally are not as God meant them to be, that 
human nature itself is fallen, is central to Augustinian Christianity. Based on the 
scriptural narrative of the fall of Adam and Eve, this conviction is fleshed out in 
various accounts of the doctrine of original sin constructed by theologians and 
philosophers. lo the radical version of the doctrine proposed by Augustine him-
self, original sin is transmitted from Adam to his progeny by biological inheri-
tance, yet it brings with it individual guilt despite the fact that it is innate. In the 
milder version proposed by Schleiermacher, the sinfulness innate in the individ-
ual "is the sufficient ground of all actual sins, so that only something else outside 
of him, and not anything new within him, is needed for the generation of actual 
sin."5 In either case, humans left to themselves would not flourish in this life. Of 
course Augustinian Christianity is also convinced that humans have not been left 
to themselves; the incarnate Christ has superabundantly atoned for all human 
sin. Nevertheless such human flourishing as is possible involves a ceaseless 
struggle against interior evil. And it can never be a wholly human achievement 
but must always be at least in part a divine gift. 
Contrast this grimly realistic assessment of the human moral situation with 
the optimistic paganism of Aristotle. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, Aristotle 
"holds that human beings are naturally drawn toward virtue rather than vice, 
love more than repudiation--and that, given sufficient education, material sup-
port, and personal effort, most people will be able to make good and reasonable 
lives for themselves" [my emphasis].6 It is thus reasonable for Aristotle to think 
that human beings can, operating on their own steam, so to speak, flourish and 
so be happy over the course of an earthly lifetime. Would it be reasonable for 
Christians to share this thought? I think not. 
It might seem that Hauerwas would disagree. He professes to take it that 
"fundamental to Christian convictions is the assurance that anyone who has fol-
lowed the way of life we call Christianity will be able to look back on their life 
and say, 'I would not have it otherwise."' But actually this remark is ambiguous 
because it fails to specify the standpoint from which such a retrospective assess-
ment is to be performed. In Christian eschatological hope, there is such a stand-
point. It is loving union with God in the afterlife; there human beings will reach 
the goal for which God created them; there they will truly flourish and be happy. 
From that point of view alone will it be possible to look back on one's life as an 
earthly pilgrim and wish it unchanged. Or, at any rate, so says Christian faith. 
But that is not the standpoint from which Aristotle proposes to evaluate bu-
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man lives. Aristotle's perspective allows him to see nothing beyond completed 
earthly lives, and so he must judge flourishing and happiness in secular terms. 
From this point of view, it is quite reasonable to insist that good fortune is a pre-
requisite for human flourishing, for the activities that, according to Aristotle, 
constitute a happy life are not possible in the absence of such conditions as good 
health and a modicum of wealth. Christianity's larger vision makes other possi-
bilities available. Misfortune, far from ruling out ultimate happiness, may prove 
a blessing in disguise if it enables the one who suffers it to draw closer to the 
suffering Christ in love. Providence may be giving to the wretched of the earth--
those suffering most desperately from poverty and disease--opportunities that 
the comfortable would envy if they saw things in their true colors. This is a famil-
iar litany, but it is very remote from Aristotle's way of seeing things. At least 
some Jives in which Aristotle would not be able to find happiness will neverthe-
less, if the Christian promise is true, be crowned with a kind of happiness he at 
best only dimly imagines. 
So I see a gulf that amounts to an abyss between Aristotle and Augustinian 
Christianity on the question of happiness. For Aristotle, it is a secular human 
achievement in favorable material circumstances; for Augustinian Christianity, it 
is an otherworldly hope and must ultimately be a divine gift. This disagreement 
is bound to be reflected in further differences in the way ethics is conceived in 
the two traditions. We may therefore expect Aristotle and Augustinian Chr isti-
anity to disagree sharply over the place of the virtues in the moral life and even 
over which traits are genuine virtues. I propose next to argue that such expecta-
tions are not going to be disappointed. 
WHOSE VIRTUES? 
As has often been noted, the virtues suffer from severe cultural relativity. To 
be sure, there may be some character traits such as prudence that everyone 
needs in order to live well, but the sort of industriousness needed for flourishing 
in a bourgeois mercantile society would be out of place in a traditional African 
culture. So we should expect there to be only partial overlap between Aristotle's 
virtues and the Christian virtues. This is exactly what we find. And the differ-
ences go much deeper than the fact that many Christians would supplement 
Aristotle's list of virtues by adding to it the theological virtues of faith, hope and 
charity. 
It is striking that Aristotle does not even include piety in his long list of vir-
tues. Nussbaum conjectures that "this probably indicates his interest in separat-
ing practical reason from religious authority, and in keeping reason, rather than 
such authorities, in control of the most important matters."7 Augustinian Chris-
tians, who hold that human reason was enfeebled but not utterly corrupted by 
the fall of Adam and Eve, will quite properly be skeptical of such naive confi-
dence in the ability of human practical reason to rule well in the most important 
matters. Moreover, Aristotle clearly would not have counted as blessed all the 
people Jesus did: the poor in spirit, the sorrowing, the lowly, those who hunger 
and thirst for holiness, the merciful, the simple-hearted, the peacemakers, and 
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those who are persecuted for holiness's sake (Matthew 5:3-10). Not all such 
people would have flourished in ancient Athenian society, but Jesus promises 
them a great reward in heaven. 
Aristotle differs from Augustinian Christians not only in what he fails to 
praise but also in what he praises. As Hauerwas points out, Aristotle's high-
minded man welcomes great risks because he desires to do good but is ashamed 
to accept a good turn; "he is so because by doing good he is able to put the other 
in his debt while providing himself with an added benefit." Aristotle shows his 
astuteness as an observer of human psychology in noticing that those who regard 
themselves as self-sufficient find it easier to give than to receive. But Augustinian 
Christians should, I think, look on Aristotelian high-mindedness as a manifesta-
tion of vice rather than of virtue. It bespeaks sinful pride, if not serious self-de-
ception, not to acknowledge that we cannot be self-sufficient, that we need divine 
gifts if we are to have even a chance of overcoming interior evil and attaining 
happiness. Hauerwas is, of course, aware of the strains in Christian thought that 
would support such a judgment. In a footnote, he cites a passage in which 
Gilbert Meilaender speaks of "the Christian emphasis on grace, the sense of the 
sinner's constant need of forgiveness, and the belief that we can have no claims 
upon the freedom of God."8 He does not, in my opinion, fully appreciate how 
deeply alien the Aristotelian emphasis on self-sufficiency is to this way of think-
ing. 
But it is at another, more theoretical level that the deepest difference between 
Aristotle's conception of the virtues and the divine command moralist's concep-
tion emerges. For Aristotle, the virtues hold pride of place in ethical theory. 
They are not properly understood as dispositions to produce independently de-
fined or recognizable good actions or states of affairs; rather good actions or 
states of affairs are defined as those a virtuous person would voluntarily produce. 
From the point of view of the divine command theorist, Aristotle has got things 
backwards. The will of God, the commands that express it, and the moral laws 
those commands establish are primary for ethics, and so obligations to obey 
moral laws will be the fundamental facts of morality. Virtues will be construed as 
dispositions to obey various divine commands, and the virtue of obedience itself 
will be at center stage. Indeed, even Aquinas, who follows Aristotle as far as he 
thinks he safely can, allows that obedience is the greatest of the moral virtues 
and that all acts of virtue, insofar as they come under a precept, belong to obedi-
ence. He says that "properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we con-
temn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the moral virtues, 
which contemn other goods for the sake of God."9 This is, I take it, a far cry 
from Aristotle. 
Yet it is part of Christian thought's legacy to modernity, transmitted by way of 
a Kantian morality of duty, that it seems perfectly natural to many people to 
think of the virtues as secondary to laws, principles or rules. Hauerwas notes this 
in passing by remarking in a footnote that most philosophers and theologians 
who write about ethics still "treat the virtues as dependent on more 'principled' 
approaches to ethics." In a way, it is puzzling to find secular moral philosophers 
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doing this. Such puzzlement seems to lie behind Eliz.abeth Anscombe's cele-
brated claim that it is not possible to have a law conception of ethics "unless you 
believe in God as a lawgiver."10 And Bernard Williams, who displays a certain 
amount of sympathy for Aristotle, regards morality, whose purest and deepest 
representation he finds in Kant's ethics of moral obligation, as something we 
would be better off without. Alluding to American slavery, he styles morality 
"the peculiar institution," though he admits that it is "the outlook, or, incoher-
ently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us."11 Doubtless our Judeo-Christian 
heritage helps explain why a morality of laws and obligations to obey them is a 
part of our outlook, and I confess to feeling a great allegiance to morality so 
understood. I also suspect that this is a point at which Christians may be called 
upon to take a stand against those who, like Williams, would like to liberate us 
from morality. Such a stand would, as I see it, also be a stand against Aristotle's 
notion of the virtues and their primacy in ethical life. 
So another abyss yawns between Aristotle and Augustinian Christianity on the 
questions of what the virtues are and of whether they are fundamental in the 
moral life. Perhaps the quarrel is at its sharpest over the nature of authority. If 
Nussbaum is right, Aristotle's view is that ethical authority lies with human prac-
tical reason and religious piety is not a virtue in the moral sphere. For Augustin-
ian Christianity, ethical authority resides in the divine will commanding and reli-
gious obedience is the greatest of moral virtues. And, as we shall next see, the 
urgency of God's claims on us will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Au-
gustinian Christians to go along with Aristotle's account of the importance of 
human friendships. 
WHICH FRIENDSHIPS? 
Jesus commanded His followers to love the Lord their God with their whole 
hearts, with their whole souls, and with all their minds (Matthew 22:37). He im-
mediately added that they should love their neighbors as themselves (Matthew 
22:39). It seems that there is tension, if not outright conflict, between these two 
commands. If we are required to devote ourselves wholeheartedly and totally to 
love of God, then we may not have left over time or energy enough to do a 
proper job of loving either self or neighbor. So perhaps Christians will have to 
confront hard choices between divine friendship and human friendships of cer-
tain sorts. This is what Robert M. Adams calls the problem of total devotion. 12 
Total devotion to God appears to press us in the direction of exclusive devotion 
to God. 
Augustine responds to the pressure by downplaying the importance of human 
friendships. In a famous but troubling passage, he cites the commandment to 
love the neighbor and goes on to ask whether man is to be loved by man for his 
own sake or for the sake of something else. Appealing to a distinction between 
enjoyment and use, he says: "If for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of 
something else, we use hirn."13 Augustine then registers his own conviction that 
man is to be loved for the sake of something else, from which it follows that hu-
man love of self and others should be a matter of use. Referring back to the 
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commandment to love God with all one's heart, soul and mind, Augustine re-
marks that God "did not leave any part of life which should be free and find it-
self room to desire the enjoyment of something else."14 And from this it follows 
that human love of self and others should not be a matter of enjoyment. So it 
appears that for Augustine friendships among humans are to be restricted to the 
realm of the useful. 
This position stands in sharp contrast to Aristotle's views on human friend-
ship. As Hauerwas points out, Aristotle holds that the highest form of human 
friendship obtains between good people who are alike in excellence or virtue. In 
such friendships between virtuous equals, the friends find joy in one another. 
Utility friendships and pleasure friendships are, for Aristotle, only inferior forms 
of friendship; indeed, they are only called friendship by analogy because they 
bear some resemblance to virtue friendships. Aristotle's ideal of friendship tran-
scends the bounds of the useful and makes room for equals in virtue to enjoy 
and take pleasure in one another's good qualities of character. 
Even Augustinian Christians may not wish to adopt Augustine's own severe 
attitude toward human friendships, and so perhaps the stark contrast between 
Augustine and Aristotle on this point can be mitigated if not entirely eliminated. 
One way for Christians to proceed, it seems to me, is to suppose that God wishes 
us to love ourselves and our neighbors as He loves them. Lacking nothing, God 
does not love His creatures because they are useful to Him but for their own 
sakes; knowing that His creation is good, God delights in it. If we do likewise, it 
will not interfere with whole-hearted devotion to God but will strengthen it by 
uniting us more closely to Him in shared activity. Thus, Augustine notwithstand-
ing, God did leave a part of life free for loving creatures for their own sakes and 
for enjoying one another. Total devotion to God does not entail exclusive devo-
tion to God because our love should diffuse itself over the whole of creation as 
His does. In this respect, Francis of Assisi is the exemplary Christian saint. 
But this line of thought, though it softens the clash between Aristotle and Au-
Christianity in one way, only serves to heighten the contrast between 
:hem in another. Aristotle restricts the highest kind of friendship to good people 
ivho are equal in virtue and insists that we must be satisfied with only a few 
'riends of this kind. This does not mean, as Hauerwas takes pains to emphasize, 
hat Aristotelian virtue friendships are limited by gender or social class, for man 
lDd woman, slave and free can be equal in virtue. It does mean, however, that 
\ristotle's ideal of friendship is much less inclusive than the ideal of love of 
1eighbor if that Christian ideal is understood, as the parable of the Good Sa-
11aritan suggests it should be, to imply that our love of one another should be a 
eflection, albeit a pale one, of God's love for us. Surely God's love is not re-
tricted to His equals in excellence or virtue. If it were, it would not reach out 
eyond the boundaries of the Trinity to seek us. And plainly God's love is not 
mited to the virtuous among His human creatures. If there is no love between 
iod and a human creature, it is not because God has not offered love but be-
rnse the creature has refused it. The atoning work of Christ's suffering and 
is, after all, a gift to all humankind. If that is the paradigm we are to imi-
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tate, then Christian love of neighbor must be on offer to all and cannot be con-
fined, without being stunted in its growth, to the narrow circle of one's equals in 
virtue. No doubt space can be made inside the realm of Christian love for some-
thing like Aristotle's virtue friendships as well as for other attractive forms of 
interpersonal bonding. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that Christian 
love lays on us much more extensive and stringent demands than Aristotelian 
friendship does. 
"It is interesting," Hauerwas notes near the end of his discussion of friend-
ship, " that Jesus does not ask the disciples to be friends, but he commands them 
to be friends." Indeed, it is interesting; but from my point of view it is not sur-
prising. Hauerwas is commenting on the passage in Christ's last discourse which 
says: "The command I give you is this, that you love one another" (John 15:17). 
It is easy to see how Aristotelian friendships between equals in virtue could arise 
spontaneously and naturally. According to the old saw, like is attracted to like, 
and virtue friendships are defined as relationships between those alike in their 
excellences. But even Christ's first disciples were a mixed bag, and his followers 
today are a very motley crew. So the requirement that they love one another will 
not necessarily square with their natural inclinations and must have the con-
straining force of a command. There is, however, nothing special about this case. 
As Augustinian Christians see it, our moral obligations are generally contrary to 
the rebellious tendencies of the Old Adam within us; and as we divine command 
theorists would insist, they are imposed on us by a God who by right lays down 
the law for us. 
CONCLUSION 
In biology, taxonomists are often divided into lumpers and splitters. Lumpers 
stress similarities and downplay differences; splitters draw attention to differ-
ences and deemphasize similarities. Those who, like Aquinas and Hauerwas, 
wish to appropriate Aristotle's pagan wisdom· for Christian ethical thought tend 
to be lumpers. These comments should make it very clear that I am a splitter by 
temperament. Wishing to highlight what is distinctive in Christian ethical 
thought, I picture Aristotle as deeply alien to it and so find attempts to assimilate 
his pagan wisdom to Augustinian Christianity problematic at best. I think Aris-
totle should be read with suspicion by Christian theologians and philosophers. 
But Christian ethics is the property of a community, not of a single individual. If 
the community is to learn to correct for the tendencies to exaggerate manifest in 
the work of both lumpers and splitters, it will have to discover how to give due 
weight to both similarities and differences between Athens and Jerusalem. So we 
splitters should be grateful for the work of lumpers like Hauerwas; such work 
provides a counterweight to our propensities to make too much of differences. 
And, speaking personally, though I continue to disagree with Hauerwas over 
matters of substance and emphasis of the sort I have endeavored to bring to the 
fore in these comments, it is only fair to conclude by acknowledging that thinking 
about his reflections on Aristotle's ethics has helped me to clarify and deepen 
my own vision of what Christian ethics is and should be. 
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